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of scale to an economy of choice. It presents the historical context of how
design relates to the economy of scale, and why underlying forces of that
economy reduced the relevance of user experience and focused design
practice on appearance. It discusses why manufacturers now meet the
desire for more consumer choice through over-production. It explains
how this leads to an “innovation gap” in which companies know how to
make anything without knowing what to make.
This article presents a model of the core capabilities of design, showing
how they relate to economically viable ways of providing choice. The
model involves a closer ﬁt with emerging production processes related to
platforms, the maker movement, and open innovation. In this model,
such capabilities provide more exploratory and responsive ways to create
innovation than a reliance on the predictive methods inherent in the
economy of scale. This leads to a “whole view” model of innovation.
The model proposes a way of “sketching” innovation initiatives that
involves fundamental questions: What is the offering? Who is it for? Why
will it create value? How will organizations make it a reality?Copyright © 2015, Tongji University and Tongji University Press.
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During the mid-1990s, executives at GM and Toyota each made a billion-dollar bet.
Eiji Toyoda, Toyota’s chairman in Nagoya, Japan, and the patriarch of its ruling
family, was worried about the future of the automobile. In response, Yoshiro
Kimbara, then head of R&D, set out to develop a new car that could be sold globally.
He had two goals: create new ways of producing the car, and achieve dramatic
improvement in fuel economy. Takeshi Uchiyamada, a senior engineer and an
expert in noise and vibration control, was selected to lead the project. Toyota gave
him four years and 200 million yen to develop an engine that was three times
cleaner and twice as efﬁcient as the current engines.
Uchiyamada had no idea how he was going to do this. Even if he achieved this
goal, it seemed like a road to nowhere: marketing research said people would want
larger cars for the foreseeable future. One only needed to look on American streets
to see the obvious preference for large vehicles and the clear lack of concern for
fuel efﬁciency. Creating an unwanted engine, no matter how sophisticated,
seemed like an assignment to end a career.1
Meanwhile, executives at GM headquarters in Detroit had the same view of
American streets being increasingly populated with ever-larger SUVs. They also
saw the numbers predicting an increase in sales of large vehicles, and with full
conﬁdence and optimism, they bought Hummer.2
In hindsight, with Toyota’s Prius becoming an icon of sustainability and with
GM’s divestiture of Hummer and eventual bankruptcy, it seems that Toyota’s bet
was obviously right, and that GM’s investment was dubious. But exactly the
opposite was true. The management methods created in the twentieth century to
help companies predict markets gave GM executives the conﬁdence to follow
numbers and make a safe bet. In this context, Toyota’s decision was high-risk.
The problem was that GM was looking at conventional data that they were
able to gather, while ignoring the public’s nascent yet unspoken and unmeasured
concerns about sustainability and its emerging desire to spend less on fuel. Ana-
lysts could count the number of people saying they wanted larger cars, but they
had no way to measure daily actions indicating a burgeoning sense of environ-
mental responsibility. Consumers were not lying when they said they wanted
larger cars. What is an executive to do when increasingly sophisticated consumers
do not clearly knowwhat it is they truly want? Bob Lutz, then vice chairman of GM,
said that hybrid engines were an “interesting curiosity.”3
At that time Toyota was recognized as the industry leader in manufacturing,
but thought of as a follower in design and technology—albeit a fast one.4 How
could Toyota create multiple technical innovations and design an iconic car in so
little time? How could GM executives be off course by 180 degrees when they could
see the growing interest in environmental responsibility and sustainability—and
actually lived in what would become the primary market for the Prius? With all the
resources available to GM’s many intelligent executives, who have degrees from
the best schools of engineering and business, why was it so difﬁcult to predict what
cars to make?
The Quest for Certainty
During the 1950s and 1960s, the US auto industry was at its height. All of the
companies had adopted the platform-creating theories and processes ﬁrst
deployed on a large scale by Alfred Sloan while he was CEO of GM.5
Before Sloan developed this approach, it was standard practice for the devel-
opment of a new model to require that all parts and components be new. This
meant teams would work on a new engine, new transmission, new chassis, and
other expensive components. With platforms, however, the most expensiveDesign and the Economy of Choice 59
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60components in a car are shared among a fewmodels. Instead of a company needing
15 different engines for 15 different models, ﬁve engines could cover the 15 models.
The standardized use of expensive components across a number of automobiles
proved very successful.
Indeed, this was one of the key methods that enabled GM to pass Ford in the
market and become the largest company in the world.6 Despite this advantage,
platforms also made cars much more alike. American consumers had the choice
between different brands and styles; they could choose among degrees of sporty
cars versus family-oriented cars, and among basic versus luxury makes. Even so,
they had essentially no choice regarding the size and fuel efﬁciency of the vehicles.
GM had several brands, including Chevrolet, Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick, and
Cadillac. The company promoted many models of each brand as meaningfully
different one from the next. In reality, several models shared a few platforms. The
result was that they were more or less the same. Within this limited range of
choices, market researchers could trust the answers consumers gave to their
questions. When the automobile market was stable, without disruptive technolo-
gies or disruptive business models, executives could accurately predict what their
consumers would buy. They could therefore decide what their factories should
make. They had achieved the quest for certainty.7
But a long-term quest for certainty carries major risks. History shows the
continual and generally disruptive development of new inventions, new methods,
and new frameworks. When a major shift in technology, economics, or the daily
life of human beings occurs, they need new ways of seeing and new ways of acting.
In the middle of the 1800s, for example, it became evident that the trans-
continental railway systems of North America could not function with reliable
schedules if every town remained on local time. In response, the leaders of the
major railroads in Canada and the United States met in Chicago in October of 1883
to adopt standard time zones for the continental US and Canada. Europe also
experienced this problem. British Railways had adopted London time in the 1840s,
and a changing world saw the need for coordinated time; the ever-increasing global
sea trade between and among maritime empires raised questions that could only
be settled by establishing a common prime meridian. Soon after the Chicago
meeting, experts from around the world met in Washington, DC, to determine a
prime meridian and global time.8
Until those conferences, local time meant that noon occurred when the sun
stood over the church steeple at the center of town or the town hall clock tower.
But noon shifted minute by minute, inch by inch as the sun passed from dawn till
dusk around the planet. Trains lefts Chicago at one time and got to Denver at
another—and people who set their clocks by the church steeple sometimes missed
trains, while trains might not connect. A key element of the modern world had
been set in place.
As organizations shifted to the large scale of the twentieth century, they needed
new frameworks and methods to ensure expected returns on the increasingly large
investments in huge production facilities. In the era after World War II, factories,
warehouses, delivery channels, and media grew to unprecedented scale. To mitigate
the risk of huge investments in production capabilities, executives needed new tools
to predict various dimensions of their businesses. These tools included ways to
manage money, predict markets, identify competition, and operations.
An example of such a tool is the use of a company budget for planning the
upcoming year, rather than simply analyzing the past year. In 1922, James O.
McKinsey, an assistant professor of accounting at the University of Chicago,
published the landmark book Budgetary Control.9 In this book, McKinsey outlined a
three-part framework for the use of budgets:she ji The Journal of Design, Economics, and Innovation Issue No.1, Autumn 2015
Should we be 
a cost leader or 
differentiated?
What are 
my goals for 
higher share 
or  higher 
margin?
What parts of 
my production 
capabilities 
have extra 
capacity?
What stage 
gates will assure 
I stay on time 
and on budget?
What demographic 
groups are growing?
What channels are 
attracting?
What are 
competitors 
making?
What is 
selling well?
What do 
consumers 
and customers 
want?
Brand
Product
Management
Strategy
Operations Marketing
Figure 1 A set of standard
questions has evolved, shown on
the perimeter of the adjacent di-
agram, that is readily recognized
by any manager who works for
any mid- to large-sized company.
Notice how the questions are
very good if the goal is innovation
based on what exists today.1. Monitor the operations of separate departments such as sales and production.
2. Coordinate the operations of departments into a whole business.
3. Note future conditions and business cycles and shape plans to meet these conditions he
called “forecasting” or “business predicting.”
McKinsey recognized that these activities were related; various organizations
already practiced them in informal ways. He noticed the patterns underlying these
informal practices, developing a general framework to explain those patterns. In
doing so, he made it easier for executives to lead organizations, easier for students
to learn new processes, and easier for researchers to build on prior work. The idea
of using the budget for “business predicting” captured the attention of executives.
The demand for McKinsey’s services led to the creation of McKinsey & Company.
The attraction of executives to frameworks that allowed them to understand
and plan for the future was understandable. Organizations were increasingly
required tomake large, long-term bets that were an intrinsic part of the substantial
and expensive production facilities at the core of their operations.
There are numerous examples of academics and others deﬁning new frame-
works for managing twentieth century economies of scale. These include Robert
Merton, a Columbia University professor who invented the process of gathering
potential customers to discuss concepts for a newproduct in the 1940s, as opposed to
relying solely on the guesses of companymanagers. Another was Harvard University
professor Michael Porter’s theory of corporate strategy, developed in the 1970s.Design and the Economy of Choice 61
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62The economy of scale changed how companies were organized and how they
competed. It caused managers to ask new questions and create new frameworks
and methods to answer them (ﬁg. 1). More than this, it required the creation of
entirely new ﬁelds; public relations, advertising, merchandising, mass media, and
the design ﬁeld called styling were invented to get people to consume the output of
the hugely efﬁcient factories.
Inventing new methods and even new ﬁelds was a costly investment for in-
dustry. This investment was warranted. Millions of people bought things that were
fundamentally the same in this new economy of scale, an economy that powered a
new form of industrial revolution.
Running Forward, Looking Backward
It is impossible to predict the outcome of adopting new transformative technolo-
gies. We can nevertheless be sure that initial attempts to create products and
services based on emerging technologies will mostly fail. While companies can
envision the tangible beneﬁts that a new technology will bring to people and
companies, they see these in terms of the existing ways people live, and the current
ways companies make money. They typically do not see how the new beneﬁts
create new dimensions in daily life and ways to create value. Companies try to use
frameworks from the past to understand the people and companies of the future.
As a result, they often invest in products and services that fail.10
Eventually, new frameworks emerge to explain how users, businesses, and
technology adapt, and ﬁnd amutually acceptable level of ﬁtness. This was visible in
the second industrial revolution. Driven by such technology breakthroughs as the
Bessemer steel process, electriﬁcation, mass production, the assembly line, and
telephone and radio broadcasting, we created production facilities, companies,
and markets of unprecedented scale; yet many failures occurred before industry
found ﬁtness and balance. An early idea for using the telephone involved enabling
people to hear concerts from neighboring cities. Reframed as a tool for talking,
another idea involved placing one telephone on every city block. The persistence of
old frameworks obtains: we still call such tools “telephones,” although they are
largely used to transmit electronic data in one form (or format) or another.
Similarly, the “horseless carriage” began its life at the center of technological
experimentation as an expensive toy for wealthy hobbyists. Ford developed a new
assembly process, convinced that the emerging middle class would buy standard-
ized cars. With such business innovations as a dealer network, a savings bank for
employees, and a vertically integrated supply chain, Ford reorganized great parts of
modern life around the automobiles that hemanufactured at the River Rouge plant.
At the same time, he gave a new name to a form of industrial economy: Fordism.
The latest iterations of the Industrial Revolution have enabled hundreds of
millions of people in the twentieth century to live a middle-class life. While the
meaning of the term “middle class” has many nuances, depending on nation,
income level, assets, and habits, 13% of the world’s population is now in themiddle-
income tier, with an additional 9% in the upper middle-income tier.11 At the same
time, a massive number of people internationally have risen out of poverty to
attain low-income status. With a total world population of 7.3 billion,12 that means
a global middle class of more than 1.6 billion people, along with a massive low-
income group including more than 4 billion people emerging from poverty.
In the shift from a world where poverty was the general condition to the
world in which we live today, the Industrial Revolution created a consumer-
driven society. This, in turn, enabled companies to grow, creating and distrib-
uting new wealth while creating jobs and opportunities for the world’s industrial
societies. At the same time, this has created unintended consequences, withshe ji The Journal of Design, Economics, and Innovation Issue No.1, Autumn 2015
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Drucker, Managing in the Nextproblems that were ﬁrst identiﬁed in the 1970s.13 It is only now, however, that the
magnitude of these problems is becoming clear. A consumption-based economy
leads to the unsustainable use of natural resources, as well as creating anthro-
pogenic climate change. While corporate growth creates wealth, unchecked
corporate growth can lead to impoverished citizens, even while such growth may
be good for the GNP.
Twentieth-century innovations were driven by cheap oil, ﬁxed production, and
economic standards ignoring difﬁcult-to-measure, intangible values: what is the
value of clean air? What is the cost to society of poor schools? In contrast, future
innovations will often be driven by cheap information and ﬂexible production
systems, and the organizations that produce them will track both tangible and
intangible values. Many of these organizations will also be in the not-for-proﬁt and
public sectors.
But we are only just beginning to understand the nature of how our lives ﬁt
into this future. We urgently need frameworks that let us face forward to get a
clearer view of the social and economic dimensions of our future world, and
especially how they might interact with emerging technologies.
The transformations taking place today seem as profound and consequential
as the changes that took place when the industrial age turned the world upside
down one hundred years ago. This time, however, transformation is characterized
by a shift from an economy of scale to an economy of choice: driven by ﬂexible
production and new business models, consumers have more options for every-
thing—how they live, how they work, how they learn, and how they play.
With unlimited permutations of choice and behavior among consumers, it has
become increasingly difﬁcult for companies to predict what consumers want.14
Lenses that were reliable in the relatively stable twentieth century are not strong
enough to focus on the blurring world of changing technologies, business models,
and consumers’ daily lives. Though still important, such issues as deﬁning market
segments, optimizing operations, and the other management processes invented
in the last century are part of the price of market entry, rather than a way to
succeed within it.
Design, however, does offer companies away towin in this timeof extraordinary
choice. Considering holistic systems, recognizing intangible value, and reframing
problems are among the ways that design creates value for business today.Society (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 2002).
14 Barry Schwartz, The Paradox
of Choice: Why More Is Less (New
York: Harper Perennial, 2004).Reframing Design
The next time you are in New York, visit the constructivist collection at the
Museum of Modern Art. Look at two small paintings by László Moholy-Nagy, Con-
struction in Enamel 2 and Construction in Enamel 3. Moholy-Nagy created these in April
1923, shortly after he joined the Bauhaus faculty in Weimar.
The paintings are beautiful, but we are looking at them for a special reason.
How Moholy-Nagy made them is what interests us: the artist did not himself apply
the paint to these works. Instead, he gave precise speciﬁcations for production by
telephone to fabricators at a local enamel factory.
Moholy-Nagy’s approach to these works differed radically from the typical
artistic process of the twentieth century in which a single person conceives,
sketches, and makes the artifact in a single stream of activities leading from one to
the next. In earlier centuries, when art was among the artisan craft guild tradi-
tions, some masters created sketches or engaged in some tasks related to an
artwork while assigning other tasks to apprentices. This was also the case in stu-
dios, where the same master might undertake works of art, useful artifacts, ar-
chitecture, jewelry, and other projects. Moholy-Nagy was probably the ﬁrst artist toDesign and the Economy of Choice 63
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Figure 2 The four key questions.
64give a verbal description to workers who used industrial processes to translate and
execute an artwork, when the workers themselves did not aspire to becoming
artists or artisans. Moholy-Nagy had unbundled the activities of conception and
speciﬁcation from the activity of fabrication.
Taking a process that once seemed a single continuous ﬂow, breaking it into
steps, and using the steps in new ways is one of the issues that Moholy and other
Bauhaus masters explored. In creating these two enamel paintings, Moholy seemed
to ask a question: “If mass production overtakes hand-fabrication, how does this
change the nature of conception and speciﬁcation?” This question was core to the
emergence of design as a ﬁeld distinct from art and craft.
Several key changes took place in the context of how products and informa-
tion were made and used in the industrial economy that grew over the different
phases of the Industrial Revolution. In manufacturing, production capacity
changed as waterpower gave way to coal and ﬁnally to electricity. Where small
factories formerly often had little more capacity than was needed for local or
regional markets, the massive capacity of mass production led to national markets.
Large-scale department stores, catalogue stores, and national chains emerged to
meet the needs of an urban middle class. In many ways, such ﬁelds as marketing
and design answered the need for new type of specialists in a new economy.
As manufacturers began to serve dispersed markets that were distant to them
and less familiar, these new specialists helped to bridge the growing gap between
makers and users. Marketing and design explained the needs and desires of con-
sumers to manufacturers who made things to meet the needs of as many people as
possible.
The Bauhaus and the Deutscher Werkbund are examples of the kinds of in-
stitutions that catalyzed the emergence of design as a separate ﬁeld. Architects,
craftsmen, and artists joined together to explore how the mass production of ob-
jects would inﬂuence social patterns, cultural values, economics, and other aspects
of daily life, often asking how technology, mass media, and information systems
would play a role in the process. They also explored new ways of working in which
they would conceive and specify artifacts when others would use industrial pro-
cesses to fabricate the ﬁnal product.
Throughout history, craftsmen have had a deep and holistic understanding of
the relationship between what should be made for local users, why it would be of
value, andhow slowly evolving traditional technologywould shape the artifacts they
made. They had a sense of the comfortable ﬁt that created a seemingly natural bond
connecting an object’s function and aesthetics, the people who would use it, why it
would make economic sense, and howmaterial and processes would make it real.15
Their informal sense of these key issues can be stated more formally as four
fundamental questions (see ﬁg. 2):sheWhat should I make?
Who is it for?
Why will it create value?
How should I make it?These questions were core issues in crafts long before industrialization. Today, they
are central to the thinking of entrepreneurs who start new ventures, and entre-
preneurs within large organizations who seek innovations leading to higher than
average proﬁts. These questions may seem simple, but they are often forgotten in
the quest to answer the questions shown in ﬁg. 1.
The increased speed and scale that Moholy-Nagy and his contemporaries
witnessed in the world around themmade it clear that they would have to expand
their knowledge and methods beyond their traditional craft.ji The Journal of Design, Economics, and Innovation Issue No.1, Autumn 2015
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decisions occurred at an unprecedented speed and scale. The nature of their
problems changed as they designed new types of things to be made by machines
rather than with their hands, products to be sold in far-ﬂung and distant mass
markets rather than to the individuals who were their neighbors. The context of
making, using, and creating value had changed.17 Philip B. Meggs and Alston
W. Purvis, Meggs’ History of
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18 See Bryan Burrough and
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A cursory glance at the history of design practice in the last half of the twentieth
century shows how changes in the contexts of business, use, or production would
lead to new design applications.Gate: The Fall of RJR Nabisco
(New York: Harper Business,
2009 [1990]). This classic story
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in Halberstam, The Reckoning.Growth in mergers & acquisitions led to corporate identity
By the 1960s, it was clear that being the largest company in an industry had
competitive advantage. Local companies became national, and national companies
became international. In some instances, corporate strategy meant dominating a
single industry. In others it meant occupying multiple industries with different
ﬁnancial cycles. The desire to be as large as possible, as soon as possible, led ex-
ecutives to grow through merger and acquisition rather than organically. While
newly merged companies—frequently operating in different industries and varied
geographies—may have ﬁt together from a ﬁnancial perspective, they often made
for odd couplings in terms of culture and capability.
Leaders of huge companies increasingly focused on stock price rather than on
products and services.16 Business theorists claimed that the purpose of business
was to create shareholder value. Corporate presidents and CEOs talked to analysts
on Wall Street more than they talked with the people who used their products.
In this context, companies called on designers to create new names and
identity systems. The appearance of products became merely the entry cost of
doing business rather than a differentiator. Massimo Vignelli, Jay Doblin, Ralph
Ekerstrom, and others at Unimark International; Wim Crouwel at Total Design in
the Netherlands; Ivan Chermayef and Tom Geismar; and Gordon Lippincott at
Lippincott & Margolies set new standards for creating systems that designed
products, communications, buildings, and nomenclature systems for everything
from products and services to the name of the company itself.17Emphasis on marketing and ﬁnance while ignoring quality led to design for
manufacturing
In the 1980s, business challenges in the United States began to shift again. Com-
panies had become primarily focused on product appearance. At the same time,
their main focus turned to the ﬁnancial and accounting activities enablingmergers
and acquisitions,18 such that they neglected the technical quality of their
products.19
In the meantime, Toyota and Sony were proving to American consumers that
small, low-cost products from innovative companies could function as well as their
high-end counterparts. In response, industry turned to design. They engaged de-
signers toworkmore closely withmanufacturing engineers. The goal was improving
the technical quality of products, whether basic offerings or luxury goods.Embedding computers in media and things led to interaction design
At the same time, computing technology was being directly integrated into
products and media. While working on the GRiD Compass in the early 1980s, Bill
Moggridge and Bill Verplank at ID2 realized that the most important design aspectDesign and the Economy of Choice 65
20 This is based upon a conver-
sation between Bill Mogreridge
and me in January 1983.
21 See, for example, Susan E.
Squires and Bryan Byrne, eds.,
Creating Breakthrough Ideas: The
Collaboration of Anthropologists
and Designers in the Product
Development Industry (West-
port, Conn.: Bergin and Garvey,
2002); Wendy Gunn, Ton Otto,
and Rachel Charlotte Smith,
eds., Design Anthropology:
Theory and Practice (London:
Bloomsbury Academic, 2013).
22 Lucy A. Suchman, Plans and
Situated Actions: The Problem of
Human-Machine Communication
(Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1987).
23 Donald A. Norman, The
Design of Everyday Things:
Revised and Expanded Edition
(New York: Basic Books, 2013
[1988]).
24 Patrick Whitney, “People,
Not Markets,” American Center
for Design Journal 6, no. 1 (1992);
Whitney, “End of Mass Innova-
tion,” IDSA 5, no. 2 (Spring
1986).
66of their product was its software interface, not its physical form. It was at this time
that they coined the term “interaction design.”20
To streamline the performance of what had traditionally been the domain of
“print” offerings, Hugh Dubberly, Doris Mitsch, and Clement Mok from Apple
Computerswere among theﬁrst to create interactivemedia offerings. It soon seemed
normal for designers to set the parameters that deﬁned the way that people would
interactwith informationandproducts.Theendusermadetheﬁnaldesignchoicesby
selecting the particular functions and features that met immediate personal needs.
Too many choices and features led to user research
In addition to information and products beginning to react and be complicated,
consumers and users were faced with an unprecedented number of choices.
Together, these changes caused an underlying power shift from individual pro-
ducers to consumers. It became key for organizations to understand people’s needs
and aspirations more deeply than people understood about themselves. To ﬁnd
that depth, innovators turned to ethnography, a set of methods created by an-
thropologists to understand unfamiliar cultures in foreign lands.21 Companies
now had consumers with so many choices and such increased variety in their
patterns of daily life that they were essentially members of a foreign culture.
John Seeley Brown, Chief Scientist at Xerox Corporation and Director of its Palo
Alto Research Center (PARC), was the ﬁrst business leader to bring ethnography into
the corporate world in a signiﬁcant way. In the early 1980s he was leader of the
Cognitive Systems Laboratory at PARC. Lab scientists were exploring the nature of
collaborativework, different stylesofhuman interactionwith information, andother
fundamentals of human-computer interaction.These factors had become important;
computing was increasingly embedded in products and systems used by people
without any technical knowledge. To meet this challenge, Brown hired Lucy Such-
man, then an anthropology professor at the University of Michigan. Her assignment
was to bring ethnographic methods to a lab staffed by scientists. Suchman’s work at
PARC added to the body of knowledge of ethnographicmethods, setting the stage for
user observation in companies. It led to her 1987 book Plans and Situated Actions, one of
the key foundations of the emerging ﬁeld of Human-Computer Interaction.22
Suchman’s work at PARC demonstrated the value of anthropology to the
design ﬁeld, while design and innovation realized the value of ethnography and
ethnographic methods; a signiﬁcant illustration of this was practiced at Rick
Robinson and John Cain’s consulting ﬁrm E-Lab, which used applied ethnography
to help companies understand their users.
Donald Norman, experimental psychologist and cognitive scientist at the
University of California, was and remains a seminal ﬁgure in design and user
research. First published in 1988, Norman’s The Design of Everyday Things provides
many of the concepts and frameworks used in the ﬁelds of design and computer-
human interaction today.23
The ability to make anything led to strategic design
The 1980s and 1990s saw the rise of ﬂexible manufacturing and global supply
networks. These enabled companies to meet the varying needs and desires of
consumers and customers; previously governed by the rules inherent in the
economy of scale, companies began adapting to a world governed by different rules
in the new economy of choice.24
This capacity came at a price: it led to an overabundance of offerings. As ex-
ecutives began to realize that they could make anything, they also came to under-
stand that they were unsure about what to make. They turned to strategic design to
help them deﬁne new offerings and new businesses. Larry Keeley and Jay Doblin atshe ji The Journal of Design, Economics, and Innovation Issue No.1, Autumn 2015
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that focused exclusively on strategic design to help companies plan their futures.
Each new application depended upon designers who worked differently from
the norm—and an executive who believed design would help his company, even if
there was no proof. Raymond Loewy could not have designed the company-saving
1939 Studebaker Challenger without the trust of CEO Harold Vance. Recognizing
that the nature of the workplace had changed, Steelcase leader Rob Pew used Larry
Keeley’s advice to inﬂuence strategy. Steve Jobs accorded Dubberly, Mitsch, and
Mok the latitude they needed to develop iconic interactive media projects that
served a purpose for years to come. Even though there was no proof that design
would beneﬁt their companies, executives who have collaborated with designers
did so because they believed it was the best way to not only get ahead, but also
serve their customer base.
While both business leaders and designers would work in new ways with the
emergence of new challenges and applications, the types of core capabilities at the
center of design remained the same.The Core Capabilities of Design
The capabilities of design were, at ﬁrst, invisible and informal. They became
increasingly evident as designers worked on a variety business challenges. As in
most emerging ﬁelds, a few thought leaders began to discuss their informal work
in focused reﬂection and writing. This led in turn to more reﬁned capabilities that
improved future applications, which were also easier to teach.25
A good example is Jay Doblin’s notes about a scale of abstraction. Before
helping co-found Unimark, he had been Raymond Loewy’s lead designer in New
York and then Director of the IIT Institute of Design from 1955 to 1969. Doblin had a
remarkable ability to uncover the essential need underlying a challenge, a capa-
bility called “abstracting the problem”. He taught this method at the Institute of
Design and demonstrated it to clients. This expanded the boundaries within which
they could explore options while remaining focused on the central intent of the
project they were addressing.
In her post dated April 26, 2012, Helen Walters describes Doblin’s thoughts on
abstraction using the redesign of a gas pump as an example:Desi“LEVEL 1: The designer accepts the pump’s performance but shortens and
cleans up its form.
LEVEL 2: Performance improvements are made. Either money, gallonage, or
ﬁllip can be punched directly. Inserted credit card automatically bills the
customer.
LEVEL 3: Changes the basic mechanism. The station is like a parking lot where
hoses are pulled from trap doors below ground. All the controls are on the
nozzle.
LEVEL 4: Involves products that are outside the company’s control. No liquid
fuel is pumped; pressurized cartridges are inserted into the car. One cartridge
ﬁts all cars (like sealed beam headlamps), a one-price sale.
LEVEL 5: The service performed is changed; there are no more gas stations.
Fuel cartridges are bought anywhere, like beer.
LEVEL 6: The service is eliminated; cars never need refueling, they run
indeﬁnitely on atomic power.
LEVEL 7: Transportation is eliminated; all human contact is by
telecommunications.”Walters also observes that “It means that 35 years ago, designers were [already]
thinking about increasing their scope from object to system, about how to elevategn and the Economy of Choice 67
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68themselves from beyond providing the superﬁcial aesthetic appeal of a product to
considering its strategic consequences, even its point of existence.”26
Fig. 3 illustrates the eight core capabilities of design, including abstraction. It
indicates their relationships to the fundamental questions of design, and to a more
expansive set of concerns that are vital to innovation.Reframe: Realize that the initial deﬁnition of a challenge may not be accurate. Create a new
frame for understanding what is needed
Reframing describes a new direction for a project. It depends heavily on abstraction
and new insights gained through empathy. In the case of Apple music, music in-
dustry executives thought they were creating value by manufacturing CDs, while
Apple reframed the challenge as “helping people enjoy music.” This led them to
create a phenomenal new retail experience. They reformatted the music offering
by focusing on songs rather than albums. They wrote a new contract for digital
rights management that would make the downloading transaction legal, creating
more balanced beneﬁts for listeners, musicians, and publishers, all the while
generating other innovations.27Abstraction: Discover the core value that can be created or enhanced
Projects often begin with an answer in mind. Continuing to ask “Why?” to discover
the core value that can be created leads to meaningful, novel solutions. A good
example is the way Steve Jobs abstracted the concept of the “MP3 player andshe ji The Journal of Design, Economics, and Innovation Issue No.1, Autumn 2015
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Lab http://helsinkidesignlab.org.software to organize music” to “enjoying music,” directly competing with Napster
and other software used to steal music.
Imagine New Options: Create new ideas that make sense even when evidence is limited
In the late 1800s the American scientist and logician Charles Sanders Pierce wrote
about a third type of logic that could be used to make logical conjectures with
relatively little evidence. Called abductive logic, other ways to describe it include
‘hypothesis formation’ and ‘argument to best inference’. An abductive inference
reasons backward from a likely outcome, to ask, “If this is the result, what could be
the most likely cause?” Physicians often use abduction in making diagnoses based
on observation. Designers use abduction to propose options based on user obser-
vations. Both use incomplete information, yet each has a sound reason to believe in
value of a proposal.28 As we shift to an era ﬁlled with uncertainty, organizations
need a wider variety of plausible options. The type of intelligent creativity that
characterizes design achieves this.
Visualize Ideas: Turn abstract ideas into concrete examples
Projects are frequently launchedwith anabstract verbal description that eachproject
teammember may interpret differently. By visualizing and prototyping early ideas,
design enables all involved to see the alternative ramiﬁcations of different options.29
Empathy: Know users better than they know themselves
Companies normally think of users in terms of market segments. These are
normally a cross between a range of demographic characteristics and a propensity
to buy things within the categories of interest to the company. By observing what
people do rather than asking questions about purchasing preferences, the design
process can discover patterns that can lead companies to create offerings that
people do not know to request. A simple example is Oxo Good Grips.
Sam Farber, the founder, worked with Smart Design to design potato peelers
and other household tools with large rubber handles that looked good. He had
observed that people with arthritis could not hold the small handles on existing
products. He also knew that a much larger group was buying elegant kitchen
products. By expanding his customer base among this second group, Farber was
able to sell the product for much less than the dull looking products that had been
designed exclusively for people with arthritic hands.
By empathizing with both groups, Farber created a product that millions of
people love but none had asked for. Had Farber done traditional market research,
he would have discovered no segment for relatively expensive, specialized kitchen
gadgets, other than the market for people with arthritis. Just because a market
segment does not exist does not mean that a need or aspiration does not exist.30
Probabilistic Systems: See relationships among things that do not seem related
Designers are comfortable making decisions with information that is logical and
supported by evidence, yet still incomplete and unproven. Complex deterministic
systems—like building a bridge—have known factors and speciﬁable results.
Working on ways to reduce morning trafﬁc congestion on the bridge has incom-
plete and unreliable information in fuzzy areas, like how people make decisions
about the route they take to get to work in the morning.31
Operations: Know the general options for production and the social context for gaining
acceptance in the organization
Since the shift of design from making things to specifying them, the operational
aspect of design knowledge has taken on a more important role. This role rangesDesign and the Economy of Choice 69
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70from gaining approval for an idea to knowing which manufacturing processes to
consider.
Value Creation: Recognize unusual opportunities to create value, particularly intangible
value
Companies that were ﬁrst adopters of quality assurance programs had a compet-
itive edge over other ﬁrms—until quality control programs became standard. The
intangible value that design creates is today’s competitive edge. Consider Apple’s
balance sheet: design appears as a cost, but it remains invisible on the revenue side.
Individual consumers cannot buy design, but we can buy the offerings of
outstanding companies who deploy design as a competitive resource.From an Economy of Scale to an Economy of Choice
There are many historical precursors to the “age of mass production.” The British
industrial revolution in textile production was one. Another was the creation of
interchangeable parts in the “American system of manufactures,” ﬁrst visible in
producing ﬁrearms. The American Civil War was a major catalyst, with its in-
novations in the mass production of arms, clothing, and food.32 Even so, it was not
until he saw the moving carcasses of slaughtered animals on the “disassembly
lines” of Chicago’s meatpacking district that Ford conceived of assembling cars by
moving parts to stationary workers rather than the prior practice of moving
workers to the parts.33
Ford’s massive River Rouge plant was at the conﬂuence of these elements,
enabled him to create low-priced automobiles and highly-paid workers who could
afford the cars he manufactured. This set the stage for continuous growth in efﬁ-
ciency across a range of industries, and within 50 years, created a society in which
most people lived a comfortable life—working in and buying from companies that
could predict the future to a reasonable degree.
Nevertheless, the advantages of mass production and mass markets contained
the seeds of their own destruction. Companies have to be large in order to take
advantage of standardization and economies of scale. Similar offerings mean
simpler and cheaper operations, yet even as companies succeeded at fulﬁlling
customers’ basic needs, they had to create greater variation in offerings to attract
and retain them.
Providing more variety allows companies to come closer to meeting the
particular needs of each consumer. But this development leads to overly compli-
cated production systems and an excessive number of stock keeping units. In-
ventories grow difﬁcult to store, and difﬁcult to manage. In addition to executives
who face the chaos of increased complexity, consumers also become confused by
too many choices and confounded by too many functions and features.
Depending on the industry, the advantages of classic mass production and
marketing are reaching their limit. Most companies that became leaders during
the age of mass production are now embracing transformation—or they are in
decline.34
The questions in the outer ring of ﬁg. 3 help leaders and designers in under-
standing what to make next when extending currently successful products and
services. However, these particular approaches work against creating the far-
reaching innovations that can lead to higher than average proﬁts.
What would have happened if the Prius, the Walkman, Starbuck’s, Facebook,
or any other major innovation had been subjected to these kinds of questions at an
early stage? None of these products and services was requested and none had a
market. These kinds of questions would have killed them all. Even thoughshe ji The Journal of Design, Economics, and Innovation Issue No.1, Autumn 2015
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Over the last half-century, companies have dramatically increased their knowledge
of how to make things and how to use new business models. This causes an
increased variety of products for users. It results in users having more choices,
which in turn causes companies to be less certain about what to make (see ﬁg. 4).
Corporate decision makers have been dragged away from a relatively secure
world in which competition centered on optimizing known production processes
and reducing known costs. Executives now live in a world where technology and
new business models enable them to make almost anything. People are able to live
more varied lives as companies fulﬁll ever more reﬁned choices. But this new
overabundance of consumer choice creates a new risk: it has become increasingly
difﬁcult for producers to know what consumers want and need.
This divergence between greater knowledge of how to produce almost any-
thing and less knowledge of the patterns in users’ daily lives is called the innova-
tion gap. Awareness of this gap is one of the main reasons that companies are
increasingly adopting design principles. The goal is to reframe what they once
thought of as the original problem in a way that is more likely to lead to offerings
that are different to and better than the offerings currently available.The Risk of Trying to Avoid Risk
Executives must respond rapidly to the fast-changing lives of their consumers, and
the rapid changes of the world in which they live. Executives and their customers
both face ambiguous, even volatile, problems sometimes described as “wicked
problems.”35
For example, many companies are ﬁnding that factories, once major assets in
the economy of scale, have become liabilities in the economy of choice. A lack of
ﬂexibility has become a source of risk rather than stability. This risk is exacer-
bated when competitors use the world as a factory, choosing the most appro-
priate production facilities for products designed to ﬁt users’ needs and
aspirations.36 However, as companies outsource their manufacturing and supply
chain to enable more ﬂexible production, they still face the prerequisite question:
What to make? Welcome to the uncertain world of “foggy problems.” These
problems come in many forms and sizes, and often seem to have more than one
answer that is obviously right. They always have a level of ambiguity caused by
multiple variables. Information is incomplete and changes quickly. OutcomesDesign and the Economy of Choice 71
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72rely upon such “soft” factors as values, beliefs, and the activities of daily life. It is
not possible to address foggy problems using the methods that worked in the
economy of scale.
It is impossible to meet these challenges by conducting deeper user research
formore insightful predictions. What companies need is a way to engage in the fast
exploration of possibilities without limiting that exploration to the possibilities of
new offerings. What happens when exploring possibilities includes different
models of value creation, different models of operations, and different models of
user experience that permit a whole view of the challenge?Sketching The Whole View
Designers sketch rapidly and casually. Sketches, drawings, and diagrams are
particularly valuable early in the design process as a way of thinking about the
project rather than illustrating the right answer.
Because it is common in business to deﬁne a solution at the outset of a project,
sketches normally focus on deﬁning the look and feel of what users will experi-
ence. This process involves optimizing current knowledge to improve usability and
appearance. This “direct design” approach moves directly from analyzing current
reality to creating a predictable extension of current reality.
Direct design is less effective when uncertainty increases. For example, direct
design may not be the best approach to creating a new offering for an unfamiliar
market. Direct design is far from the best approach when the problems that face
organizations involve new production processes or new business models. The
greater the uncertainty, the greater the need for an approach that lets organiza-
tions explore several options before committing to one solution.
What if it were possible to do more than sketch the character of offerings
based on seemingly unchangeable models and processes? What if we had ways to
sketch value creation, use, and production?
Despite the uncertainties inherent in the economy of choice today, we
know that there are many different ways to address questions related to
creating value, understanding users, and managing operations. When an orga-
nization consciously begins to work on foggy projects, it requires a tool kit to
“sketch” an initiative, which of course means more than simply sketching
product ideas.
As Roger Martin eloquently describes, design is able to deal with today’s
problems because it is based on a third type of logic, called abduction.37 First
described by Charles Sanders Peirce, abduction is particularly useful for dealing
with problems when one does not have enough information to form a sound hy-
pothesis, and what might constitute a successful solution is not entirely obvious.
The design process often uses an abductive, exploratory approach by not accepting
a problem as originally stated, which makes it particularly well-suited to the kind
of problems that do not lend themselves to standard methods of analysis and
optimization.
The model in ﬁg. 5 gives a whole view of innovation frameworks and methods
that enable fast, informal sketches that work descriptively and prescriptively.
What to make?
Three Levels of Innovation
This framework helps assess the proximity of a potential project to what is
currently available. It describes innovation projects by ﬁtting them into one
of three levels: steps are incremental modiﬁcations to existing offeringsshe ji The Journal of Design, Economics, and Innovation Issue No.1, Autumn 2015
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Figure 5 The methods and
frameworks in the outer circle can
work in concert to sketch options
for novel business models, opera-
tions, use cases, and offerings.whose practicalities remain within the known; jumps are similar to steps, but
a little more uncertain as they involve new elements, for example new technology;
and leaps are based on compelling ideas involving new tools and methods, which
open up new worlds of opportunity worth the risks they imply.
Strategy Pyramid
This framework helps the team to determine whether a project is about changing
offerings, the systems and platforms used for making new offerings, or the design
of organization itself. During the 20th century design was viewed as a process for
shaping objects, environments and messages. Nowmany of the core capabilities of
design are inherent to the planning of the systems that underlie the ﬁnal offering
and extend to the design of the organization.38
Insight Matrix
The insight matrix tool, developed by Vijay Kumar,39 can lead designers to
discovering patterns not visible through conventional forms of questioning and
analysis. This tool, based on comparing scores of user observations, is useful in
abstracting and reframing a problem.
Company Territories
Together with user terrains, company territories map the relationship between
customers and users and the products and services they buy. Terrains describe
aspects of users’ lives independent of what the company makes, like “enjoyingDesign and the Economy of Choice 73
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74social, family time.” Territories are areas of opportunity that companies carve out
inside or astride such user terrains, for example “a service dedicated to Saturday
evening family events.”
POEMS
This framework recognizes that designers commonly create entire systems of of-
ferings, which can include People, Objects, Environments, Media/Messages, and Services.
Examples of this include the behavioral characteristics of the staff at Starbucks or
Nordstrom’s (People); the new generation of dentist chairs, or the retractable belt
stanchions used to control crowds (Objects); the interior of the Apple Store or the
business class seats and seating sections of major airlines (Environments); and the
caller guidance systems of successful customer support centers (Media/Messages).
Prototypes
Used early in the development process, two kinds of prototypes are relevant to the
exploratory work needed in the economy of choice.
Concept prototypes help team members explain early ideas to each other by
creating rough approximations (low ﬁdelity, low resolution) models. As project
development moves forward, concept prototypes become increasingly accurate in
representing what the concept will be (high ﬁdelity) and becomemore detailed and
reﬁned with respect to ﬁnal product appearance (high resolution).
Behavior prototypes, effective after user observation, help teams discover aspects
of user activities. They are designed to elicit visible activities, andmay look nothing
like the ﬁnished offering.
Who is it for?
User Terrains
Terrains are identiﬁed by people’s aspirations and needs: the high-level goals
people have for themselves and those close to them. These can be identiﬁed by how
people spend their time, attention, andmoney. Aspirations include having a happy
and inviting home; succeeding at a sport or hobby; providing enriching life ex-
periences for one’s children; and achieving high social status.
Terrains are different from the market segments that classify people based
on demographic factors and their propensity to buy what a company offers. In
contrast, establishing territories inside existing terrains, or carving out new
territories between terrains allows companies to focus on goals. Separating
terrains and territories helps companies avoid myopically positioning people in
the context of the company rather than in their own human context. While this
may not have been important when people had few choices, it is essential
now.40
Observing Users
Observing users is one of the design capabilities undergoing the greatest change.
On one hand, user observation developed in parallel with the specialties of user-
centered design and interaction design to the extent that many equate user
research with design research. This is problematic, as many other theories,
methods, tools, and practices form areas of design knowledge that require inves-
tigation and development.
It can also be argued that the importance of user observation has led to the
widespread acceptance of trivial and often incorrect assumptions. This includes
believing that tiny sample sizes can uncover what users will do rather than real-
izing that small samples can enable a design team to reframe their ideas aboutshe ji The Journal of Design, Economics, and Innovation Issue No.1, Autumn 2015
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Things.what users might do. Another incorrect assumption involves the belief that
inventing a user scenario based on one’s own personal experience has any use at
all. So, too, is the practice of inventing so-called “personas” that simply reﬂect the
ideas of the designer, and testing user scenarios of personas that are merely ideas
in the mind of the designer. Such practices raise a crucial question: Are we
working in a “design bubble” in which the claims about design are outpacing the
substance of the ﬁeld?
The growing economy of choice will increase the need for understanding users
using rigorous methods that increase the depth and speed of observation. This
need is partly being met by using the same technologies that are enabling the new
economy. A few interesting examples are emerging. John Cain, TJ McLeish, and
Rick Robinson at Iota are using sensors embedded in user environments. Kim
Erwin at the IIT Institute of Design is taking advantage of the ubiquity of the web
and new protocols for engaging groups in deﬁning problems. Tom MacTavish, also
at the IIT Institute of Design, is using mobile telephones and principles of the
emerging ﬁeld of persuasive communication to let users record and reﬂect upon
their own activities.41
Modes of Experience
Like user observation, the relationship between design and user experience is
often thought of in curious ways. There is no widely agreed upon approach other
than the injunction to “be like Apple.” A more useful framework describes user
experience as having ﬁve modes: physical, cognitive, social, cultural and
emotional. Of course, users do not separate their experiences into thesemodes, but
the distinction is useful for designers considering how people will experience their
design.
Some of the examples that follow are wide-ranging, but to illustrate how these
facets of experience act together, an example from the health care sector is also
provided.1. Physical. Considering the physical mode of experience focuses designers on
the abilities and limitations of the body. The classic example of this is tableware
for the disabled by Maria Benktzon and Sven-Erik Juhlin of Ergonomi Design in
Sweden. Both the split keyboard and the Leap chair from Steelcase also beneﬁted
from designers’ concerns for this mode. Examples from health care include
childproof caps on medicine bottles that require users to have hands stronger
than those of a child, or the system of levers that enables a nurse to raise a patient
bed.422. Cognitive. Focusing on the cognitive mode helps make designs more under-
standable. It includes the design of products, product interfaces, software, and
instructions to make them easy to use. It is also central to simplifying complex
information management tasks such as generating ﬁnancial statements and
completing tax forms. The Apple OS interface and the instructions for IKEA
products are good examples. The medical ﬁeld is full of examples, including the
time-saving tools used by staff to learn how to operate new equipment, and the
tools that facilitate self-care after a hospital visit.433. Social. Often the “user” is better thought of as a group rather than as a set of
individuals. Team spaces at work, temporary workspaces at hotels, airport lounges,
control rooms for power stations, and war rooms for the army all work better when
designed with group dynamics in mind. Nursing stations and operating rooms areDesign and the Economy of Choice 75
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76examples of hospital environments that require groups to share a large amount of
fast-changing information.444. Cultural. Thinking about the cultural mode helps design for populations that
do not know each other, but may share beliefs, habits, values, and activities. It is
typically one of the aspects of experience, along with the emotional, to which
designers pay the most attention. Styling and quality are normally decided upon
with the values of a large segment of the population in mind. This is noticeable
when comparing Starbucks to Dunkin’Donuts: they both sell above average coffee,
but Starbucks is much more culturally engaging, while Dunkin’ Donuts is more
transactional. In a hospital environment, the value that the culture of the nursing
profession places on “caring” could lead to designing nursing stations that provide
direct line-of-sight contact with patients.455. Emotional. Raymond Loewy, and other design stars of the 1930s through 1950s,
created streamlined shapes for fast trains which they transferred to staplers, pens,
radios, toasters and other stationary objects to express a feeling of modernity to a
population that was tired of the dreary terror of the Depression and WWII. Simi-
larly, Apple borrows the purist forms of Braun in their attempt to make people feel
that their complex machines are simpler and more uplifting than the complex
products of other computer manufactures. In the health care industry, advanced
children’s health care centers are conducting many experiments with designers in
an attempt to make patients feel less anxious.Stages of Experience
Similar frameworks developed at Doblin and at Conifer Research use a 5-phase
structure similar to the order users travel through an experience. Like the modes
described above, users do not think of their experiences in these stages. However,
it is useful for design teams to think of these stages.
 initial attraction
 entering and orientation
 being engaged and participating
 exit
 extending the experience through photographs and conversations and other
ways.How to make it?Road Maps
Road maps are plans describing how an innovation will launch, and its subsequent
stages of growth. They require the determination of “success criteria” for the user
and for the business. These criteria govern the integrity of the offering both when
it is launched and as it grows, which helps to counteract the common trend toward
normalization.46Activity Systems
Professor Michael Porter of Harvard created the activity systems framework to help
executives see the interdependencies among the key activities needed to bring an
innovation to life. Taking these interdependencies into account while the project is
still at anearly phase allowsexecutives to ascertainwhere an important activity lacksshe ji The Journal of Design, Economics, and Innovation Issue No.1, Autumn 2015
47 This kind of insight is a
typical discovery in robust pro-
totyping ventures of the kinda necessary prerequisite activity. Without this early view, it is likely that executives
will not discover missing capabilities until after the innovation is launched.47that typify the Design Factory
model in use at the Aalto Design
Factory in Helsinki, The Aalto-
Why will it create value?Tongji Design Factory in
Shanghai, The Swinburne
Design Factory in Melbourne, or
the ME310 projects at Stanford
University. One reason that
companies engage in these pro-
jects is that they can learn about
missing capacities in an earlyValue Proposition
Geoffrey Moore, a thought leader for the high tech industry in Silicon Valley has
developed a value proposition framework described in his book Crossing the
Chasm.48 The framework gives a structure for brief statements that describe the
breadth of a new offering and its competition.stage at the relatively low cost of
sponsoring a project. Com-
panies can then take promising
projects forward, either by
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rdValue Web
Value webs are sketches of business models that enable a team to explore where
value can be created or lost. Exploring options for offerings is often artiﬁcially
constrained by assuming the business model is unchangeable. Value webs identify
the people and organizations that give and receive value. The value can be of any
type: products, services, money, brand, or any other entity that makes it worth-
while for each stakeholder to be a participant in the web.the Chasm, 3 Edition: Marketing
and Selling Disruptive Products to
Mainstream Customers (New
York: Harper Collins, 2014
[1991]).Fitting the Economy of Choice
It is difﬁcult to see the beneﬁts of new frameworks until they have been tried and
tested. Because they do not ﬁt the context that is being left, and the emerging
context is not wholly visible, they are often seen as eccentric.
However, maintaining the status quo can cause anxiety: no longer ﬁtting with a
well understood past while not having a complete view of the future that may
already be here can cause a serious dilemma. This is illustrated by a conversation I
had with a senior executive at a major consumer products company, who said: “I
know the newmethods will giveme better insights about what the company should
make; but if we use them, we will not be able to benchmark against last year.”
A historical perspective may ease the anxiety. The ﬁrst example is about
changing a liability into a resource and developing ways of counting what formerly
seemed uncountable. The second example is about knowing a concept is in the
right direction even though 100% of the data says is wrong. It is also a testament to
being able to reverse cultural values that seemed so unchangeable that they must
be universal truths.
From Cost to Asset
In 1959, Jay Doblin stepped into a new factory in the Shimomaruko district of
Tokyo where Canon was manufacturing its recently developed single-lens reﬂex
cameras. Doblin was the Director of the IIT Institute of Design and former chief
designer of Raymond Loewy’s New York ofﬁce. He had a particular interest in
planning processes in large companies. Doblin was in Tokyo to advise the Japanese
Ministry of International Trade and Industry, and to tour Japan.
As Doblin walked by the long lines of workers wearing white uniforms and
seated at benches making parts, he noticed a small number of machines making
some of the smallest components. What surprised him is that these machines were
self-operating. They made parts without direct human control.
Doblin knew of similar machines at work in factories in the United States.
Companies were using these in the continuous drive to reduce costs. Doblin had
heard that labor costs in Japan had been rising in recent years and he asked his
hosts about the savings brought by these precursors to robotic production.Design and the Economy of Choice 77
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78The Japanese executives paused, and then replied: “Mr. Doblin, we do not
know if they save money or not. The reason we built these machines is that they
make detailed parts at higher level of quality than people can make by hand.”
This was a shock. Doblin was used to seeing the quality control function at the
end of the assembly line where people would identify sub-standard products and
send them back for rework. Canon had a different point of view. This company saw
quality improvement as an integral factor in the production process.
Doblin had witnessed an early step in Japan’s effort to revitalize Japanese in-
dustry. This drive would ultimately change the connotation of “Made in Japan”
from “low quality, cheap copies” to “high-quality, modern, reasonably priced
products.”49
Canon was not alone in the quest for products of higher quality and value. W.
Edwards Deming had brought his remarkable ideas about quality to Japan in 1950
when the Japanese Union of Scientists and Engineers invited him to speak. Aware
that his ideas would have no impact, he agreed to speak on the condition that
leaders in business and industry would join the scientists and engineers for his
talks and workshops. These presentations launched a manufacturing revolution in
Japan. Eventually, the Prime Minister of Japan created the Deming Prize to be
awarded to the Japanese company that best exempliﬁed Deming’s principles.
These principles showed how to increase quality and proﬁt at the same time.
Deming himself would become one of the few foreigners to be honored with
Japan’s Order of the Sacred Treasure, while Deming’s fourteen points became a
central tool in leading Japanese industry. Quality control in North America meant
inspection at the end of the manufacturing process as Doblin realized. Quality
control in Japan meant manufacturing products the right way through effective
management a robust manufacturing process.
Among Deming’s fourteen points were three crucial processes addressing
quality while bringing design to the entire manufacturing process: “9. Break down
barriers between departments. People in research, design, sales, and production
must work as a team, to foresee problems of production and problems in use that
may be encountered with the product or service. 10. Eliminate slogans, exhorta-
tions and targets for the work force asking for lower defects and new levels of
productivity. Such exhortations only create adversarial relationships, as the bulk of
the causes of low quality and low performance belong to the system and thus lie
beyond the power of the work force. 11. Eliminate work standards and quotas on
the factory ﬂoor. Substitute leadership. Eliminate management by objective.
Eliminate management by numbers and numerical goals. Substitute leadership.”50
Doblin’s visit continued this process. His meetings with MITI helped to alter
public policy. One result was a law that required companies to demonstrate high
quality as the basis of an export permit. Before gaining the permit, companies were
required to show that their products had the same quality as the domestic products
in the importing country—or higher quality. Working together, scientists and
engineers, academics and government, business leaders and factory workers
succeeded in turning quality from a cost to an asset.
They made this change by choice. They chose to look at a broader set of factors
that had been considered intangible prior to Deming’s work.From Bigger Is Better to Smaller Is Cooler
At the same time, Masaru Ibuka and Akio Morita, the founders of a young elec-
tronics company called Tokyo Tsushin Kogyo launched the TR-63 transistor radio.
They had made previous models, but this was the smallest
(112 mm × 71 mm × 32 mm). It was their ﬁrst worldwide hit. The following year, toshe ji The Journal of Design, Economics, and Innovation Issue No.1, Autumn 2015
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A few years after Doblin’s visit and the success of the TR-63, consumers in
North America and Europe would notice Sony stereo components. While the cases
of these brushed aluminum products looked unusual to the Western eye, they
sounded great. And they cost less than the hi-ﬁ audio equipment that consumers
were used to, products in decorative wooden cabinets from such consumer elec-
tronics giants as RCA and Telefunken. The Sony products were machines for
listening. They were small enough to keep on open shelves in the home rather than
camouﬂaging them as furniture on the ﬂoor.
Treating quality as an asset meant building quality into the production pro-
cess. It also involved seeing an opportunity that would shift consumer values from
“bigger is better” to “smaller is cooler.” These are examples of people looking at
businesses differently.
A major cross section of Japanese industry saw a dramatically different way to
make products. Ibuka and Morita saw that consumers had new needs and aspira-
tions that were others did not notice.
Japanese manufacturers began making choices that ran counter to industry
conventions. But these choices were logical for those that looked at the broader
context of how things were made and used.Choices We Face Today
Visiting Shenzhen or Bangalore, it is astonishing to see the evidence of tens of
millions of people escaping poverty and entering the middle class.
Visitors to major European industrial cities during the second half of the 19th
centurywere equally amazed, aswere visitors to the greatAmerican cities of the early
20th century. Then, as now, the world saw millions of people leaving farms and vil-
lages to work in new urban jobs. Families chose to disrupt the traditional patterns of
daily life in the farming communities andmove to cities to increase their opportunity
to have enough to eat and send their children to school. Societies accepted envi-
ronmental degradation as a small price for this progress.Thepromiseofmoving from
a life of scarcity to a life of relative comfort was a trade-off worth making.
The current transformation in Asia was ignited by the low-cost production of
products and services in China and India. It is taking place at a scale and speed that
the world has never seen before.
In the last twenty-ﬁve years, hundreds of millions of people have achieved
better lives. Every day, we learn more about this growth as we try to comprehend
the staggeringly high numbers. Whether we are counting in terms of new apart-
ments and houses, newly graduated engineers and scientists, ﬁrst-time savings
accounts, ofﬁce buildings, new car sales, or hours spent in trafﬁc jams, the scale of
change is unprecedented.
But this transition also represents problems never before seen in human
history, involving the carrying capacity of the planet itself. The expectation for
greater material well-being has increased several times over, while the world’s
resources have remained the same or decreased. The Stockholm Resilience Center
has developed a model showing the limits and boundaries of nine planetary sys-
tems affected by human activity. We have already overstepped the safe boundaries
for three of those systems.51 A trade-off between improvements in material well-
being and environmental degradation will no longer work.
The environmental impact of innovation threatens to become catastrophic as
global economic power shifts to the large populations and large-scale conditions of
China and India combined with the resource constraints these nations face.Design and the Economy of Choice 79
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80China and India are becoming global centers of innovation—and of environ-
mental degradation; they will be ground zero for the coming conﬂict between
innovation and sustainability. Yet this is but one of the conundrums of our time.52
Other challenges include having enough food and clean water, creating better
schools that focus on learning rather than testing, and having health care systems
that can accommodate large and aging populations. Such problems operate on a
daunting level of complexity, scale and scope. There are no single correct answers,
and any information we do have is neither reliable nor complete.
The answers are not obvious. Neither are the questions. The likelihood of our
asking the right questions and being open to answers that are not obvious will
increase if we go beyond the standard reductive processes invented for a more
predictable world. We need to see beyond symptoms to the underlying challenges,
visualize abstract data to discover unexpected patterns, reframe orthodoxies about
what is valuable, recognize the aspirations and needs of all stakeholders, and un-
derstand the new ﬂexibility in organizations and technologies that change how
ideas are realized.
Gaining a whole view of the context in the economy of choice will not only
enable organizations offer choices without excess production, it will also help us
choose the world in which we want to live.she ji The Journal of Design, Economics, and Innovation Issue No.1, Autumn 2015
